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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - CANCER FROM CIGARETTE SMOKING
HELD ACTIONABLE - ISSUE OF CAUSATION FOR JURY. - The
plaintiff sued Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, contending
that the smoking of its cigarettes for thirty-two years had prox-
imately caused his contracting lung cancer. Negligence was
alleged for failure to conduct adequate tests to determine if
defendant's cigarettes caused cancer and for breaching the duty
to warn consumers of the presence of cancer-producing ingredients.
The plaintiff also alleged a cause of action in breach of express
warranty arising from advertisements which stated that the de-
fendant's brand caused no ills and was not harmful to the nose,
throat or accessory organs. Furthermore, breach of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
was alleged. The trial court dismissed the warranty actions
without stating whether the basis for the dismissal was insufficient
proof of causation or failure to notify the defendant of the breach
of warranty within a reasonable time. A verdict was directed
for the defendant on the issue of negligence for a lack of sub-
stantial evidence to support it. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the issue of
causation should go to the jury and that there was sufficient
evidence to constitute causes of action in negligence and breach
of express and implied warranty. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
In the law of products liability there are two major legal
theories upon which recovery is based: negligence and breach of
warranty.' To maintain an action in negligence against a man-
ufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that his injury was caused by
a defect in the product, that the defect existed when the product
left the hands of the defendant and that the defect was present
because of the defendant's negligence. 2 Likewise, a consumer
suing on a breach of warranty theory must show his injury was
caused by a defect in the product and trace that cause to the
defendant, but he need not prove any negligence on the part of
'See PROSSER, TORTS § 83 (2d ed. 1955) wherein the author cites many
cases based upon both theories. Products-liability recoveries upon other
theories occur less frequently. See generally Grigsby v. Stapleton, 94 Mo.
423, 7 S.W. 421 (1888) (nondisclosure of defect); Ralston Purina Co. v.
Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d 748 (1942) (deceit); Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), second appeal, 179 Wash. 173, 35
P.2d 1090 (1934) (misrepresentation). Most courts adopt an express
warranty theory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402B, comment d at
45 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).




the manufacturer. 3 Warranty is not a concept based on fault but
upon "the failure of a product to measure up to express or implied
representations on the part of the manufacturer or other supplier." 4
Generally, an express warranty is any affirmation or promise by
a seller to a buyer that the goods shall conform to such affirmation
or promise.5 There are two implied warranties, one of mer-
chantability, i. e., that goods are reasonably fit for the general
purpose for which they are manufactured and sold, 6 and one of
fitness for a particular purpose, i. e., where the buyer makes his
purpose known to the seller and relies upon the latter's skill or
judgment. 7
Historically a plaintiff's greatest obstacle to recovery in products
liability has been the necessity for privity of contract.8  In a
negligence action, the principle of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.9
allows a plaintiff to recover without privity where the product is
inherently dangerous and likely to cause injury if negligently made.
Just as the gradual extension of the MacPherson rule has virtually
extinguished the need for privity in actions founded on negligence, 10
a similar trend has developed in warranty cases. 1 While most
jurisdictions refuse to extend a warranty from a manufacturer
to a consumer where no privity exists, 12 many make exceptions
for food and drugs 13 and products for external but intimate bodily
use.14 There was no privity issue in the principal case because
under Pennsylvania law it is no longer required in negligence or
warranty actions.1 5
3 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Lundquist v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 42 Wash. 2d 170, 254 P.2d 488 (1953).
See James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192, 226 (1955).
4 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRoDucrs LIABmLITy § 16.01 (1960).
r Id. § 19.04.6 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954);
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
7N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw §96(1). Frequently both of these implied
warranties are present at one time. Huscher v. Pfost, 221 P.2d 931 (Colo.
1950).8 The leading common-law case is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842). See generally Prosser, supra note 2,
for an historical background of privity in this area.
9217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
101 FRU ER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, §5.03(1).
"1 Comment, Effect of Advertising on Manufacturer's Liability to Ultimate
Purchaser, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 521, 527-31 (1950).
1 Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110
(1960).
Iaid. at 1111. In RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs §402A, at 24 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1961), the advisors list the jurisdictions allowing the food and
drug exception to date.
14 Prosser, supra note 12, at 1111-12.
15 Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422. 156 A.2d 568 (1959)
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In the few cigarette-cancer cases actually litigated,, the problem
of allowing a plaintiff to introduce evidence on the issue of causation
does not appear to have been encountered. 16 In Cooper v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 7 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
reversing the District Court, found that a valid cause of action
in deceit had been alleged and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Subsequently the District Court denied recovery
for a failure to substantiate the allegations of false advertisements
by defendant.'
In 1961 the first cigarette-cancer cases ever to reach a jury
were tried in federal courts. 19 In Green v. American Tobacco
Co.,20 an action based on negligence and breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability, the following charge was directed to
the jury:
The manufacturer of products . . . impliedly warrants that its products are
reasonably wholesome or fit for the purposes for which they are sold, but
such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured
product, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight
can afford knowledge.21
In answering interrogatories, the jury found that the cigarettes
did cause the cancer but replied negatively when asked if the
defendant, at the time (1956), "by the reasonable application of
huntan skill and foresight" could have foreseen the cancer danger.22
The court in Lartigue v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 2 3
followed the Green decision in tacitly applying the negligence test
of foreseeability in an action based on warranty. Charging the
jury on the issue of implied warranty, the court stated:
If you find . . . that the state of medical knowledge was then such
that the defendants could not have anticipated in the exercise of reasonable
care that their products would cause cancer, then your verdict on the issue
of implied warranty would be in favor of the defendants. 2 4
abolished the privity requirement in implied warranty. Previously it had
been abolished in negligence and express warranty. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co.,
155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
16 A list of cigarette-cancer cases may be found in 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
PRODUcTs LIABILITY 1388 (1960).
17234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).18 Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass.
1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958).
19 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 3 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTER 110(1960); Lartigne v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 3 PERSONAL INJURY
NEWSLETTER 160, 165 (1960).
20 3 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTR 110 (1960).
21 Ibid. (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 110.
23 3 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTER 160 (1960).24 Id. at 165.
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As stated above, the basic elements of a cause of action in breach
of warranty have not included any proof of negligence or any
concept of foreseeability. 3  A plaintiff traditionally need only
prove breach of the warranty,2 6 and courts have stated that it is
immaterial whether a harmful substance could be eliminated.
2 7
In the present case the Court found that this manufacturer-
consumer relationship could support implied warranties of both
merchantability and fitness for use, i. e., that the "cigarettes were
reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking without causing
physical injury."28 Moreover, the opinion declared that a jury
might find an express warranty had arisen from a national ad-
vertising campaign in which the defendant had expressly claimed
that medical tests had proven its product would not adversely
affect "nose, throat and accessory organs." " The Court further
stated that a jury might also conclude, from evidence showing
a failure to warn consumers of the presence of cancer-producing
substances in its cigarettes, that the defendants were liable for
negligence. 30  Thus the majority opinion shows a willingness
to allow the question of causation to go to the jury on the issues
of negligence and breach of express and implied warranties.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Goodrich agrees that there
were possible causes of action in breach of express warranty or
negligent misrepresentation, but he would stop at that point.3'
He reasoned that, absent an express warranty, the defendant could
not be held liable on an implied warranty unless the tobacco itself
were adulterated.3 2 He asserted that the situation before the Court
was akin to those situations in which a consumer's excessive
drinking causes liver trouble or where one eats salted peanuts when
he should be on a salt-free diet. The judge intimated that neither
the whiskey distiller nor the peanut manufacturer could be held
for breach of implied warranty.
3 3
25 James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 192, 226 (1955). In this
article Professor James gives a full discussion of the various remedies a
plaintiff may pursue in this area, including the requirements, limitations and
advantages of every cause of action.
26 1 FRummzI & FRIDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 16.03(4) (1960).
27Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936). See also Wilson,
Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. Rav. 614, 639 (1955). But cf. Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) wherein the
plaintiff failed to recover upon breach of implied warranty for transfusing
her with impure blood.
28 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir.
1961).261d. at 296-97.
30 Id. at 300.
31 Id. at 301-02.
32 Id. at 302.
33 Ibid.
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Because the medical profession is so sharply divided upon
the possible causes of cancer, 34 the issue of proximate cause is
much more difficult under these circumstances than in the usual
products liability case.35 The Court in the instant case allowed
this issue to go to the jury on all three counts-express warranty,
implied warranty and negligence. Patently such a view forces
the jury to depend entirely upon expert evidence and grope
blindly through an area in which the experts themselves violently
disagree. Perhaps this difficulty was recognized by the judges
in the Green and Lartigue cases and motivated them to inject
an artificial quasi-negligence test into an action grounded on
breach of implied warranty. It would seem that the line drawn
by Judge Goodrich is more realistic, in that it permits a plaintiff
to prove causation only if the manufacturer had expressly war-
ranted the product or had produced one which was adulterated.
While not explicitly so stating, judge Goodrich's reasoning follows
the theory that if the present level of scientific knowledge does
not permit the manufacture of a socially desirable product free
of possibly harmful substances, a manufacturer should not be held
liable for a breach of an implied warranty therefor."6 Whichever
cause of action is pursued, the causation problem remains-as the
jury's final determination can only be based on the most persuasive
expert testimony.3 7 However, an important factor in Judge Good-
rich's approach, which is also implicit in the Green and Lartigue
cases, is that once a cause of action on implied warranty is pre-
cluded, certain safeguards are maintained. Thus, a consumer
suing on a negligence theory must establish that the manufacturer
could have foreseen the harmful effects of its product, and further-
more may be obliged to overcome the defenses of contributory
34 Cancer of the Lung-Breach of Warranty in Cigarette Sales?, 1 Cur-
rent Med. 35 (Sept. 1954), 1 Current Med. 16 (Nov. 1954). The September
issue lists those authorities who contend smoking causes cancer of the lung,
whereas the November issue cites authorities in opposition.
35 See Foley v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y.
Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct 1930), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N.Y. Supp. 924(2d Dep't 1931) (tobacco contained segments of a dead mouse); Corum
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933) (fish-
hook imbedded in plug of tobacco). But see Rexall Drug Co. v. Nihill,
276 F.2d 637, 645 (9th Cir. 1960) where plaintiff alleged loss of her hair
from using a home permanent. In finding for the defendant it was held
that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that the cause of
plaintiff's condition was unknown.
36 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03(4) (1960). The
authors state that such a theory could be supported by courts on a policy
basis.
37 Of course this problem is not limited to medical causation. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Sterling Abrasives Div. of Cleveland Quarries Co., 5 Ill. App.
2d 1, 124 N.E.2d 607 (1955) (defective machinery); Baker v. B. F.
Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 221, 252 P.2d 24 (1953) (explosion of tire).
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negligence and assumption of risk-certainly relevant considerations
in cigarette-cancer cases. And, should the consumer sue on an
express warranty, he must show that an alleged assurance was
actually an express warranty pertaining to the harm suffered;
that it could reasonably be relied upon; and that he did in fact
rely upon it. In addition to these safeguards, the approach of
Judge Goodrich seemingly protects the manufacturer from an
excessive exposure to absolute liability based on a causal relation-
ship laden with doubt.38
REAL PROPERTY - Lis PENDENS - ACTION TO ABATE Nui-
SANCE No BASIS FOR Lis PENDENS.-The owners and developers
of a tract of land constructed conduits which collected surface
water and diverted it onto the plaintiffs' adjacent property.
Plaintiffs brought suit, seeking damages and a mandatory injunc-
tion ordering defendants to eliminate the conduits, and filed a
notice of lis pendens against the defendants' property. Special
Term granted defendants' motion to cancel the lis pendens,
conditioned upon the filing of an undertaking of $10,000. On
appeal the Appellate Division reinstated the lis pendens. In
a four-to-three decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to file a lis pendens, since the
action was one to abate a nuisance, and not one affecting the "use"
of land within the meaning of Section 120 of the New York Civil
Practice Act. Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d
302, 178 N.E.2d 717, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1961).
At the beginning of the 19th century New York followed the
common-law doctrine of Us pendens,' which provided that a grantee
of real property who received title from a litigant during the
pendency of an action concerning the land took title subject to
the outcome of the litigation.2  This rule caused hardship to inno-
cent purchasers who often had no way of discovering whether
real property was the subject of litigation at the time of purchase.-,
38 It is interesting to note that, in light of the concurring opinion, the
majority advised the lower court, on remand, to submit interrogatories to the
jury in order to ascertain upon which theory the jury reached their verdict.
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 301 n.18 (3d Cir.
1961).
11957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 88, N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENcE SECOND AN-
NUAL REoRT 107 [hereinafter cited as 1957 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 88].
2 1957 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 88, at 107.
3 Ibid.
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